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Through the translation and analysis of a major speech,
the political thought and rhetorical devices of Mohammed
Mossedeq, former Prime Minister of Iran (1951-1953), are
examined.

Just as cultural and philosophical differences

account for many problems in such a translation, so have
they led to Mossedeq's being largely misunderstood' in the

----------- -

2
West.

The study therefore presents a more positive view of

Mossedeq, emphasizing his nationalism, which has inspired
countless movements toward independence among the Third
World nations.

Chapters deal with the background of the

study, problems of translation (including the semantic and
lexical nonequivalences between languages, as well as
cultural differences), and significant details from
Mossedeq's biography, in addition to the principal translation, rhetorical analysis, and summary chapters.
Mossedeq was deeply aware of the politica1 problems
of Iran, the most important of which were:

(1) the inter-

ference of foreign powers, especially England and the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company;

(2) the total corruption of the

. Iranian government; and (3) the lack of political awarene,ss
and education of the Iranian people.

A major solution to

the first problem was Iran's nationalization of her oil resources.

The main speech reflects this event and its im-

pact on Iran, as well as on the rest of the wor1d, in the
larger context of the need for the Iranians to unite and
become conscious of their power and resources.
The speech outlines Mossedeq's political motives, his
plans for alleviating Iran's government and people.
illustrat~s Mossedeq's charismatic appeal:

It also

he was a

skilled speaker, one wh9 stirred his audiences, whether they

3

were members of the Iranian parliament (Majlis). 'or illit~
era1=e peasants.

His language was simple ye't highly com-

"municative--and
no one before him had ever received such
.
'
,

'

publi.c s.upport in Iran.
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PREFACE
Interest in the problem underlying this study evolved
. from my introduction to English as a second language.

Hav-

·ing come from Iran, a Farsi-speaking land, I soon realiz.ed
that the most important phenomenon for understanding and
communicating among people is language.

And being involved

constantly in the problems of moving from one language to
'another, I came to the clear realization that translation
is merely

inte~pretation

and, when it involves deeper con-

cepts, next to impossible.
Although I make no qlaims to have solved the basic
,problems of translation, I do feel--especially since I am
bilingual--that I have reached an understanding of some of
them,

w~ich

I hope to pass on to the reader.

Much can be

gained through comparative study, analysis, and research,
including mutual understanding and appreciation, to which
. this study is dedicated.

---._-----

-
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CHAPTER I
,INTRODUCTION.
As '1951 drew to a close, Time magazin~'s co~ittee
for Man of the Year gathered around a big' table to ma~e a
decision.
l~ast

The choice ,was 'not an easy one.

There were at

seven nominees, including such world-renowned men as

Matthew Ridgway, John Foster Dulles, Harry Trmnan, Winston
Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur.
"

,

',the man

f~nally

Yet

chosen was a far less well-known Iranian

statesman, once described by former United States Secretary
of State Dean Acheson as,
the character Lob in James Barrie's play' Dear Brutus.
He was small and frail with not a shred of hair on
his billiard-ball head; a thin face protruded into a
long beak of a nose flanked by two bright, shoebutton eyes.
His whole manner and appearance was
birdlike, marked by quick nervous movements as he
seemed to jump about on a perch. l
The man was Mohammed Mossedeq, whose selection Time
announced as follows:
In its leadership of the non-communist world, the
United States has some dire responsibilities to
1

Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation:
My Yea'rs in
the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969),' p. 503.

2

shoulder.
One of them is to meet the fundamental
". moral challenge posed by the strange old wizard who
'lives in a mountainous land and who· is . • • the man
of 1951. 2
Mohammed Mossedeq's achievements have yet.to be stud7
ied and assessed objective1y:.'

Sources of material on the

man and his accomplishments, except for those in the origina1 Farsi language, are few and inadequate.

Far this reason

a rhetorical .analysis and careful translation a! Mossedeq's
historical speeches is of vital importance.
According to Richard W. Cottam in Nationalism in !ran,
That· Time magazine, for example, should have cho·seri.
Mossedeq as its man of the year in 1952.seems now to
have been almost aberrant. Time's cover story of
Mossedeq could hardly have pleased Mossedeq's sup-.
porters; but they.ignored the story and revelled in
the implication of Mossedeq's selection. The choice
of Mossedeq was made because he symbolized the emergence in the Middle East of a popular force capable
of establishing itself in power • . • Mossedeq's
premiership remains extremely significant; b6th the
triumphs and the eventual defeat of Iranian Nationalism need to be surveyed if Iranian nationalism is to
be understood. 3
Mossedeq was the first man from the Middle East in 150
·year~

who stood against the world's greatest imperialist

power, England.

Though his stay in power was short, he

made many important contributions to Iran as well as other
2

"Man of the Year;
January 7, 1952, p. 21.

Challenge of the East,n Time,

3Richard W. cottam', Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh:
.Pittsburgh University Press, 1964), p. 269.

.-~-
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Third World countries.

This is one reason for the interest

in Mossedeq displayed by his'torians and political scien.

.4 .

tists.

.
The aim of ,this study is to be objective.

Therefore,

both the positive and,negative aspects of Mossedeq's politica'l contribution will be explored •
. On the positive side, Mossedeq is credited as being
the man who started, the Third World uprising against imperia~ist

i~

powers.

Although twenty years have

elaps~d,

Mossedeq
i

still very popular today in the under-developed coun-

tries.

In fact, leaders like Castro, Ben Bella, Sukarno,

Nkrumah, Nas$er, and even Nehru credit Mossedeq for being
· l..nspl..ra
.
. t·l..on. 5
th el..r
The negative viewpoint concentrates mainly on
Mossedeq's political mistakes and on his being a member of
a ruling-class family, as well

a~

-nationalistic or'~oo idealistic.

on his being fanatically
It is suggested that per-

haps taking on the major world powers was too big a task
for him.
In spite of the claims of either his opposition or his
, followers, history shows that whatever
ed upon.

~1ossedeq

said he act-

Mossedeq had much convincing to do, and despite

4 Ibid ., pp. 259-285.
5M. Makan, A Look Into the Life of Dr. Mohammed
Mossedeq (n.p.:
Iranian National Front in Europe, 1964),
p. 4.

+

_._.---
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all the problems that confronted him, he was immensely
per·suasive.
According to Aristotle, "The modes of persuasion are
the'only true constituents of the art [rhetoric]:
tl:l·ing else is. merely accessory. n 6
conce~ned

every-

In this study, we are

with the oratory of a major nationalist leader as

a means of persuasion.
What Mossedeq stood for is to be found in the total
substance of his speeches made across half a century:
for the

Iranians~

Iran

nationalization of oil throughout Irani

giving no concession to any foreign government or

qorpor~-

tion; elimination of corruption within the Iranian government at all levels; and correction and enforce~ent ot'
election laws nationally as well as locally.

The speeches

chosen for translation in this study. illustrate. Mossedeq's
rhetoric concerning these issues.
Through careful translation, and investigation of the
strategies and tactics of his speeches, we hope to acquire
an understanding of Mossedeq's use of rhetorical devices.
A study of Mossedeq's rhetoric may also provide insight into
the phenomenon

o~ motivating the masses to action. 7

6Aristotle Rhetoric 1. l354al. 13.
7This phenomenon was witnessed by Richard W. Cottam
during his first stay in Iran in 1951-52. He notes in
Nationalism in Iran that "the first period was the apex of
.the Mossedeq era, and the Iran I saw had much verve" (p. vii).

5
~nti-Mossedeq

sources are plentiful.

However, the

aim of this study is not to add to those sources.

On the

contrary, the emphasis throughout is on bringing to light,
, t!irough translation, 'the pro-Mossedeq 'literature.

This, em-

phasis is intentional, since, much can be learned throu,gh"
comparative studies.

That is, the propaganda of anti-

Mossedeqists permit the analyst to reconstruct .their image
Of, Mossedeq, while the vigorous Mossedeqist publications .
provide an excelient base of comparison.
This study attempts ,to maintain an analytical approach.

However, avoiding making value judgments on

Mossedeq's political ends and the means to them is not an
easy task.

But the greatest difficulty to surmount in a

study such as this one is the difference in

cu~tural

grounds--in this case, between East and West.

back-

As Charles

Malik of Lebanon has commented on the Western attitude
toward the Near East,
The Western world is responsible for the situation
in the Near East on "every level of that situation
• ". • •
Stra tegy, commerce ," exploitation, securing
an imperial route: these were why the West for the
most part came to the Near East, not because it
loved us. Add to this the immense racial arrogance
of modern Europe." The West has not been true to
itself~ and therefore it could not have been true
to us.ts
8Charles Malik, liThe Near East: The Searc"h for the
Truth,1f Foreign Affairs, January 1952, pp. 261-263.

~~---

...

---

-----
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CHAPTER II
,PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION
Experts have established that a
translation is impossible.

complete~y

accurate

They may disagree on the merits

of 'various translations, or the method to be used, but the
,m~jority

agree with $avory that "all translations seem • • •
,
1
to be simply an attempt to solve an insoluble problem~1I ,
~n thi~

chapter, however,

~e

are dealing with

~

'cer-

tain perspective on the problems of a particular tra'nslation
rather than assembling facts about it.

We are not concerned

with t1:1;e ultimate psy'chological basis of the work, b,ut rather with an attempt to at least touch upon some of the act~al,
descriptive, or cultural problems of translating it.
The main purpose of this chapter, then, is to show
what are conceived by this translator as problems.

In re-

ality, for instance, I find it very uncomfortable to hide
,my biases, because ·no matter how hard I try, 'objectivity
seems almost impossible.

It is probably the 'same with some

empirical studies, in which "non-mentalists," "objectivists,"
"behaviorists," or,scientists form their hypotheses

~n

ad-

vance, then try as hard as they can to prove them right by
I

Theodore H. Savory, The Art of Translation (New York:
Alden Press, 1959), p. 76 .

.- ....

---~---
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fitting the data and all other aspects of the study into
their preconceived notions.

Indeed, one can deal on many

different levels in explaining the problems of translation;
-

,

but,what was very significant for me was to realize that
the languages involved are made up of a unique total of
cultural ties and

philos~phies.

Perhaps, then, any lan-

,guage can only be completely understood, in parts at least,
in-its original

form~

A translator must know both languages fluently.

But

unfortunately (or sometimes fortunately) he does not have
the equivalent of all the components of one language in the
second.

Many times a term, a concept, or a word does not

make sense in another language:

consequently, the trans-

.1ator cannot totally duplicate the original.

'A translator

partially observes, reads, or hears something in one language, and if there is no equivalent in the second language,
he tries to give his own interpretation of the original in
the second language.

Therefore, the translator is at times

exposed to the same, or very similar concepts, and at other
times he is faced with a concept, word, or term that has no
,basis in another language.

That concept is thus diffic'ul t

or perhaps impossible to convey.

This non-equivalence can

occur in either direction between the first and second
language.
In this translation I have had these same problems.
Translation is interpretation, but interpretation 'is not

- -__ ,. '''' '..,'" '.

~--

---o--.;:..-=
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was allotted to payment of salaries, the average
employee received less than $100 a month. 6
3.

Pursuit of a negative political equilibrium.

Mossedeq tells how political equilibrium can take
pl~ce

in Iran:

In my op~n10n, political equilibrium will take place
in this country only when there are free elections.
Negative equilibrium does not mean that any govern- .
ment will bring all its fans to the Majlis. Negative
equilibrium, however, -means that the government
should not interfere with elections. The law of
elections will be revised, which means that truly
elected men get into the Majlis. That is when po
litical equilibrium is achieved. Under this polit
ical equilibrium, the problems of foreign govern
ments, not with one but with all, will solve
themselves. 7
In a speech given in the Majlis on December 2, 1945,
entitled "The Prevention of Issuing Oil Concessions,lI
Mossedeq said:
Whatever I have'said is in the best'interests of a
country and its government that are 'seeking politi
cal balance.
If we pursue "positive politics," how
ever, we must give a 92-year concession for the
northern oil to achieve political balance (giving
'the southern'oil to England and the northern to
Russia). The people of Iran have never agreed, and
now the Majlis disagrees about giving any oil con
cess.ions. A. concession is much like a person who
has lost one arm and now for the sake of better
balance is willing to have the other arm cut off as
well: a one-armed person is most likely in favor of
6H• B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle.
East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand,
1962), pp. 78-79.
7Historical Speeches, p. 35 (my translation) •

8
~lways

translation.

Movazene Manfi in the Farsi language,

literally,translated, is "negative
Cottam notes

th~t

bal~nce.n

But Richard W.

this English translation

-sounds like the doctrine of an irrational fanatic,
and sin,ce this was the image of Dr. Mossedeq in many,
Western minds the phrase was interpreted literally.
In fact, however, re,sponsible Iranians have' never
held such an idea. 2

t:r'
~

I'

!

i

How can I explain the concept of "negative equilibri-

1
r

'urn"

the way Mossedeq meant it in his language (Farsi),?

In

English positivist philosophy there is no basis, use, liking,
acceptance, or tolerance for negativism.
The word negative prejudices the English reader,before
. 'he even fini'shes the sentence.
tive'in the

T~ird

What Mossedeq meant by nega-

World is the most positive, phenomenon •

e'

e

or should I expect an American with all his material comfort,
or an Englishman with his positive philosophy, to look at
things as would a man from the Third World?
What Mossedeq is all about, what he devoted his total'
being to, and why he is great is that he popularized the
concept and philosophy of the Third World, that of a "negative equilibrium.

II

What he said in these two words to the

Third World (and to his own people, who now appreciate him
after many years, as the literature of intellectuals and
2 Cottam, p. 202.

I

JL_" _

9

students allover the world demonstrates 3 has a world of
~ositivism

in it.

Because the man from the Third World

knows that through "negative equilibrium" he gets back, he
"

.receives, he achieves, he collects, he gains what is his.
. right ·and belongs to him, but what has been denied him..
.viously, getting, receiving, achieving,
,gaining are all very
.'1

"po~itive"

co~lecting,

concepts in

English~

Ob-

and
but ,if

say "negative equilibrium," still the .English reader will

immed'iately think of a negative rather than a positive concept.
It took me so much explanation to say negative. in the
first language means positive in the second language, but to.
what degree have I succeeded?

How well I have translated is

not how well I have converted words and sentences, but how
well I·have conveyed the deeper concepts.
A perfect translation may be made from a short, easily
understood writing.

However, tpere are certain losses which

occur in the connotative aspects of the work.

It may lose"

some of the hidden qualities recognizable only in the original language.
The more one enters into the spirit of the language he
is reading, the more he appreciates the responsibilities of
3MOSsedeq and Negative Equilibrium: A Discussio'n on
Iran's National Movement Philosophy (Berkeley:
Followers
of the Third National Front, 1971), p. 39 •

•

•

_ _ _ _ _ _

_.

_______

•
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~
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the translator, and realizes that many times it is impossible to bring over into English the, he,art of the original
construction.

As "Herbert C. Tolman states in The Art of

,

~ust

as the eye of the artist, which by training enters more deeply into the soul of nature, realizes
more than the inexperienced eye the difficulty of the
task, and is more keenly aware of the powerlessness
of the brush to portray all that is in the landscape,
~o the trained translator appreciates how' exacting
is his art. 4
, Keeping in

m~nd

the exactness of the art of trans1a-

'tion, ,as a translator one finds two major. problem areas:
'First, con~eptua1ization, or trying to portray the original
concept as closely as possible, without getting 'mixed, in the
,s~cond

area, mechanics, which requires fo1lowinq the text,

'word by word, as closely as possible.
We have already seen an example of the problem of con,veying

~ertain

deeper concepts from Farsi to English.

As

for the second problem, when the translator keeps too 'close1y to the text, he creates a mere mechanical reproduction.
This "style" could be traced to the positivist tradition
which still prevails in many universities, and provides us
with bilingual publications that are distinguished 'by the
'dullness of the English versions.

B.

IL.

Although such

4Herbert c ..To1m'an, The Art of Translating (Boston:
Sanborn, 1901), p. 20.

11

translations are accurate, this accuracy is. only in the
meaning, not the spirit of the work.
The difficulty of word-by-word translation is illustrated by the Farsi word Tazahor.
~ent'ndemonstrationtl

It has only the equiva-'

in English, which has negative

political overtones of violence and destruction not shared
'by the original.

he

When Mossedeq used Tazahor in his speech,

was talking about his hopes that the people who were

.listening'would express their opinions, voice their de.mands, and exercise t~eir constitutional rights and freedoms
.. for. the

betterme~t

of their country.

notes peace and constructivism.

His usage thus con-'

Perhaps the best transla-

tions are the result of the work of translators who
consciously blend and balance these polar phenomena.

CHAPTER III
BIOGRAPHY OF MOHAMMED MOSSEDEQ
Mohammed Moss'edeq was born in Tehran in 1879 into the
,highest level of Iranian society.

His family were land-

"owners, and his father, Mirza Hedayat, was a minister of
, the court.

His mother, Lady Najmol-Saltaneh, was related to

the royal Q,ajar family.
After graduating from high school, Mossedeq became"
at'the age of seventeen, treasurer of the Khurassan province.

This. early political

experienc~

left him

ve~y

disap-

pointed at the corruption in government; consequently~ he
'returned to Tehran to take courses in a new school for government officials.

Going to Paris for further studies,

Mossedeq in 1906 received a diploma from the Ecole des
'Sciences Politiques.

He then studied at the University of

Liege in Belgium and at the University of Neuchatel i,n
Switzerland, where he earned a Doctorate in Jurisprudence
in 1914.

1

With his dedication, determination, family background,
and education, Mossedeq was a logical candidat,e for the
Majlis, the Iranian Houses of Parliament, to which he was
1·

Makan, p. 5.

---.-.--.---~~

---~-.-
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elected in 1915 (the third Majlis).

From 1915 to 1917,

Mossedeq served on a committee that was studying the reorganization of the Ministry of Finance.

He held a high post

in the Ministry of Justice from 1918 to 1919.
In 1920, Mossedeq served as Governor-General in the
province of Fars (Shiraz City), and in 1921, the first year
Reza Khan was Minister of War, he was Minister of Finance in
the cabinet of Qavam.,

In 1922, Mossedeq was Governor-

General of the province of Azarbaijan, whose Minister of
~oreign

Affairs he became in 1923.

From 1924 to 1928 Mossedeq served as an elected deputy
from Tehran to the fifth and sixth Majlis.

In 192.5, ·as the

outspoken leader of three other deputies, he debated against
the passage of a bill to depose of the Qajar dynasty and to
establish then Prime Minister Reza Pahlavi as Shah.
~n

this debate he made a very lengthy speech stating

that the fundamental laws of the country must pe preserved.
He insisted that these laws would be destroyed if the Qajar
were removed and Reza Khan put in their place, adding that
Reza Khan had been an effec:tive prime minister, but that as
Shah he might become a dictator.

And he warned, nthere is

.no nation that has achieved any status under a dictatqrShip.n 2
2A Collection of Mossedeq's Historical Speeches (n.p.:
.Organizations of the Iranian National Front in Europe, 1967),
p. 15 (my translation).

14
Mossedeq was reelected to the sixth Maj1is, but Reza
Shah saw to it that he was not elected to the seventh.

In

1928,' Reza Shah had Mossedeq first imprisoned and then banish~d

to exile in Ahmadabad, an agricultural village owned

by Mossedeq's family, about 100 kilometers from the capital.
In 1936,

Mo~sedeq~spent

a month in Berlin for medical treat-

ment--he had suffered from poor health all his 1ife--~ft~r
which he returned to the village.

He then spent a few

years of. enforced residence at Birjand in eastern Iran.
In 1940, Mossedeq's son pleaded his· father's case
; with Crown Prince Mohammed Reza.

But the situation remained

the same until 1941, when British and Russian troops occu. pied Iran:

in August, Reza Shah abdicated and was succeed-

ed ,by his 2.2-year-01d son, Mohammed Reza Shah.

Mossedeq,

. ,upon direct orders from the new Shah, was immediately in,formed that he was free to live wherever he pleased.

Years

later, Mossedeq remembered his subsequent visit with
Mohammed Reza Shah:
I told :the Shah, "I shall never forget the kindness
you have done for me in releasing me from your father's imprisonment. I have something'to say now that
I have the chance. II The Shah said, "Go ahead,
please." Then I proceeded: "You, Your Majesty,
should not put yourself in the same category as your
father, as you will go bankrupt. II The Shah said,
"How will I go bankrupt?" I said, "Because your
father has done things in this country that have
caused him many enemies.
It would be a wrong

15
conclusion to say that anyone who was against your
f~ther is against you because you are both Shah." 3
Perhaps as a result of his own personal experience,
Mossedeq; as the above quotation suggests, was always intere'sted in' the role of the Shah, especially as' far as the
gover~ent'was

concerned.

On one'occasi6n, Mossedeq

jus~i~

fied his view that the Shah should not interfere in
politics:
If a government position is available and ten people
apply for it, then nine losers will become ~nemi~s
of the Shah, and this number can be much greater in
the case of choosing a deputy for the Majlis, since,'
say, only one out of 135 applicants is chosen. But
if the Shah plays a neutral role, soon everyone will'
respect him, as the Shah should be respected by all.
England is a perfect example, for the king' is removed
from the running of government. If the English monarch did this, it wouldn't be so bad for you to do it.
You may think only Churchill and Atlee run ~he government, but really there are many more qualified men
running the government. If a country doesn't have
honest politicians it doesn't have anything • • • I
don't think anyone loves his country any more than
you, but if you don't have able men around' you!, wh,at
will you accomplish?4
Mossedeq consistently .and strongly pursued his beliefs
throughout his long political career.

Basically,

there'~ere

'three major areas with which his government's policy was
concerned:

i.

Correction of all election laws.

3 Ibid ., p. 109 (my translation).
4Ibid ., p. 112 (my translation).

I

17

16
Iran's bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape were
.,notorious.

Pro-western government

o~ficials

'was allotted to payment of salaries, the average
employ~e received less than $100 a month. 6

were elected in
3.

a most corrupted way, and very seldom was anyone sent to the

Mossedeq tells how political equilibrium can take

. Majiis outside of the corrupt political machine.
Mossedeq once spoke humorously of such corrupt

el~c-

place in Iran:

tions:

In my op1n10n, politic~l equilibrium will take.place
in this country on'ly when there are free elect10ns.
Negative equilibrium does not mean that apy govern~ .
ment will bring all its fans to the Majlis. Negat1ve
equilibrium,'however, means that the government
should not interfere with elections. The law of
elections will be revised, which means that truly
elected men get into the Majlis. That is when political equilibrium is achieved. Under this· political equilibrium, the problems of foreign governments, not with one but with all, will solve
themselves. 7

It is well known that' after the 'seventh Majlis election, the late Moddaress (in one of the most religious, honest and dignified statements of the time)
asked the. chief of police, "In the sixth Majlis I
had about fou~teen thousand votes. This time (the
" seventh Majlis), I assume everyone was afraid of you
and no one voted for me -- but I was wondering what
happened to the one vote I gave myself~n5
'
2.

Pursuit of a negative political equilibrium.

Fight against corruption and bribery within the

government.at all

In a speech given in the Majlis on December 2, 1945,

lev~ls.

H. B. Sharabi, in Governments and Politics of The
Middle Eastjn The Twentieth Century, explains the situa-

,entitled liThe Prevention of Issuing Oil Concessions,"
Mossedeq said:

tion:
Nepotism, bribery, and political favoritism are accepted as normal features of the administrative system. It was estimated that in the late 1950s over
200,000 persons, or about 10 percent of the male
urban population of Iran, were employed by the government: 50 percent of these were superfluous ap~
pointments made on the basis of political interest
rather than ·on administrative requirement. Moreover,
about 30 percent of the bureaucracy was considered
illiterate. Although nearly 70 percent of the national budget (excluding military appropriations)

I

Whatever I have said is in the best' interests of a
country and its government that are· seeking political balance. If we pursue "positive politics," however, we must give a 92-year concession for the
northern oil to achieve political balance (giving
the southern oil to England and the northern to
Russia). The people of' Iran have never agreed, and
now the Majlis disagrees about giving any oil concessions. ·A concession is much like a person who
has 'lost one arm and now· for the sake of better
balance is willing to have the other arm cut off as
well: a one-armed person is most likely in favor of

6 H • B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle.
East in the Twentieth Century (princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand,
1962), pp. 78-79.

5Ib.id ., p. 14 (my translation).

7Historical Speeches, p. 35 (my translation).
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,obtaining an artificial arm, if only for the sake of
appearance. The one-armed person who wants his
other arm cut off, however, would be better to give
up the misery of life and commit suicide instead. a
Mossedeq's opposition prevented his election'to the
responsib~e

parties

went on,a food strike that lasted four days.

In the

fifteenth Majlis.' He made known the
a~d
,n~xt

election, Mossedeq was a successful candidate.

The

national front headed by Mossedeq was a minority in the
Majlis.

It consisted of seven deputies (out of 72), who

made up a coa1ition 'of various political groups and parties
(including the Tudeh, Iran's Communist Party).

Despite his

poor health, he was very-active and tqok many bills to the
~ajlis,

to

such as a bill to correct the election laws, a bill

~e~cind

the Shah's ability to close

bills to prevent
and of the press.

martia~

do~n

the Majlis, and

law and guarantee freedom of speech

Of these bills, only that removi'ilg the

Shah's power to close down the Majlis was not passed.
'A bill to nationalize.oil throughout Iran was taken to
the Majlis on March 20,' 1951, where it was passed successfully.

After the oil nationalization, Mossedeq a9cepted

'the Iranian prime ministership, on condition that the
Majlis would pass the "hands off" bill (the "hands'off" bill
proposed was the enforced departure of the Anglo-Iranian

-~--~-
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Oil Company and the discontinuation of diplomatic relations
with the British).9

Mossedeq then began his government's
.

'

program of correcting Iran's election 'laws, described by
Donald N.

Wil~er

in Contemporary Iran:

Prop9sals for the ~eform of the electoral system
were put forward. '. • • These proposals were not
concerned alone with making electoral fraud more
difficult~ but also envisaged steps to insure a
more responsible electorate and a more representative list of candidates. The specific suggestions
included limiting the electorate to literat~s, limiting the number of candidates for each seat by requiring an advance deposit which would be forfeited
by those receiving the 'smallest number of vot~s,
and by holding countywide elections on the same
days instead of for a period of weeks, thus preventing candidates from running in several districts. 10
There were many objections from the British government
and its supp'orters wi thin the country to Iran's nationaliza-'
tion of her oil resources.

In October 1951, Britain took

the matter to the International Court in The Hag'ue and
later to the united Nations.
before both bodies.

Mossedeq personally appeared

His claim was that it was not a case

between two nations, but rather a case between a sovereign
nation and a private oil company, and therefore not within
the international court's jurisdiction.

Mossedeq won his

case at both courts.
When Mossedeq returned to Iran, the opposition, both
9

Speeches of Dr. Mossedeg in the Sixteenth Majlis
'(n.p.: Mossedeq Publications, 1969), II, p. 136.

10

'
Donald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York:
Frederick A. Preager, 1963), p. 126.
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from within and from without, was such that he resigned.
But a 'bloody popular movement led to his return as prime
minister.

In addition, he took over the ministership of

the Department of Defense.
Mossedeq was opposed by England, the united
and by the Tudeh, each for its own motives.

~tates,

It is known

,that the Central Intelligence Agency, with the support of
the United States government (and at a cost of 48 million
dollars), planned a coup d'etat in secret. ll In August of
1953, ,many of Mossedeq I s followers were captured; he lost
his leadership, was tried in military court, and then was
, sentenced to three years imprisonment.
In 1957, Mossedeq was released from
to Ahmadabad under parole.

p~ison

and moved

He died a natural death in 1969.

llA. Reza Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1964), p. 110.

----------_...

CHAPTER IV
. TRANSLATION OF A SPEECH I BY MOHAMMED MOSSEDEQ,'
PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN IN MAJLIS SHORAYE
(The National Assembly of Iran)
,ON JULY 11, 1952
This speech. was given in the Majlis ten days before
Mossedeq's resignation, which resul1;::ed in a people's uprising to put him back in power.
Ironically, The Hague 'Tri,bun'al's final decision regarding the controversy between Iran
and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was announced on the. same
date (known as Si Tir in Iran). Mossedeq managed to return
to power.
In addition, he took over' command of the Armed
Forces, a role formerly exclusively the Shah's.
The persuasive power of this speech has great historical'significance.
~onorable

representatives, you are aware that foreign

political pressure and domination for many.years has de,pr~ved

the people in our society of their freedom.

We be-

came so weak and hopeless 2 that it was impospible to express
an opinion or even verbally defend individual life and freedom.

In this environment of fear, the bill for extension

'the oil concession passed without protest.
no choice.

~f

The Majlis ·had

I must comment also on the lack of awareness

. shown by the Majlis as well as by the people of Iran.

There

was no chance of defeating the renewal of this horrible
lThe Farsi text of this speech appears in M. Makan,
A Look into the Life of Dr. Mohammed Mossedeq (n.p.:
Iranian National Front in Europe, 1964), pp. 41-50.
2zaboon and bichare were used, which have alternative
meanings of "poor," "needy," "helpless," n remediless,1I
"despicable. 11
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concession.

Not only were the people unaware

3

of the poli-

tical disadvantages; but from the technical and the economical point of view, there was no chance for the people or '
their representatives to make a logical statement concerni~g

the subject.
At all times, the ex-British oil company4 used its

. entire force to keep the people of Iran in total ignorance.
This was its attitude from the very beginning until the, day
the company began discussing the renewal of its concession
of 1933 for anoth~r t~irty years.
In the same way, the company used its forces to deprive the people of any knowledge of their country's GodgivenS wealth of oil.

With such tactics, it was able to

'easily plunder this vast wealth.

In other

wo~ds,

the com-

pany could, leave the poor people with empty pockets ,while
'filling those 6f its greedy investors and capitalists.

The

unawareness and ign'orance of the Iranians continued, and
without hesitation, the ex-British oil company stole our
national wealth until the foprteenth session of the Majlis.
In the fourteenth Majlis, the Soviet union found a good op.portunity to ask for an oil concession in the northern part
3Alame-beekhabari"the world of ignorance."

4Mossedeq always refers to this company as the n ex British oil company," expressing the fact that it is no
longer legal in Iran.
Ssee the chapter "Rhetorical Analysis" for Mossedeq's
usage of "God."
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of the country.

However, for the first time in the Majlis,

the voice of the oppressed people of Iran started ringing
.in·the ears of the people of the world.
I

6

attempted-to make the most of this situation by

stressing the disadvantages of giving the north's oil concession to the Russians.

I also mentioned the loss result-

ing from the 1933 D'Arcy concession to the representatives
in the Majlis.

Furthermore, I reminded the members of the

Majlis that this concession was brought to the Majlis,
passed, and imposed' upon the people at a time and place in
,history when there was no possibility of discussion and expression of opinions for the people or the representatives
in the Majlis.
Most important of all was the fact that not one ·representative opposed the bill, and it passed immediately.
Above all was the·fact that the bill for helping teachers,
although most of its content had already passed, was withdrawn at the suggestion of the Internal Revenue Secretary
due to the hasty passage of the oil concession renewal.
The verbal process has been recorded and is available to
anyone.

Also, note how they took advantage of the people's

lack of awareness and

th~

dictorial atmosphere.

The con-

cession renewal bill was passed quickly in the Majlis and
6

---------

The pronoun "In can be expressed many ways in Farsi.
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was forced upon the people.

Although the Russian request

for the northern oil concession was discussed in the Majlis
no one pursued the matter, with the exception of a few legislators and editors of the press.
sult from that situation:
their past carelessness.
knowledge of oil.
w~alth

One good thing did re-

the people became more aware of
At least the people acquired some

They 'realized the value of this national

&nd 'how freely they were losing it.

You respectable

representatives remember the combat and struggle and how
during the extension of the fourteenth session of the
Majlis the representatives were very concerned over the in, ,

creasing

~wareness

of the people.

Gradually they were par-

ticipating in their own destiny and learning to voice their
opinions.

With the new awareness of the people, the repre-

sentatives to the Majlis began to worry about their reelection.

Therefore, against constitutional law, they

'discussed the extension of the fourteenth Majlis.

Not only

was this a violation of the Constitution, it was against
:public opinion as well.
The first section of the Constitution provides that a
new session of th,e Majlis will be postponed as long as foreign forces remain in Iran.

My idea was to use the legal

time for postponing the fifteenth Majlis and prolonging
the fourteenth for two reasons.
the election process.

First, I wanted to correct

Second, I did not want the new demo-

cratic freedom which was taking'place in the Majlis to be

25
interrupted, even for a short period of time.

I

kept wait-

ing for one of the political parties or people seeking correction, to say something or have some kind of demonstration.

7

During the last days of the fourteenth Majlis, a group 'of
1.

people from the left political party attacked and stopped
the Majlis from continuing their work.

This action occurred

at exactly the same time that one of the representatives of
tpe major· world powers said that to improve relations with
the

go~ernment

the governor of

of Iran, he would be willing to speak with,
Qavam-~not

with anyone else (Qavamsolsal-

'taneh was the Prime Minister of Iran at the time).
The left parties became more confident--not that
Qayam's government was in a position to make the oil deals
with

Russia-~and'

they did whatever they could to insult or

threaten the representatives of the fourteenth Majlis.
The fourteenth Majlis failed to have a majority present at
any

~irne.

A majority was not even present for the report

of the Prime Minister on his trip to Moscow.
After the election of the fifteenth Majlis, a change
in government occurred.

The Prime Minister

surance regarding candidates.

fe~t

more as-

There were many direct and

indirect activities to stop the minorities, who were against
7unlike the Western concept "demonstration," which is
a translation of the Farsi word, t'a'zahor means "expressing
one's opinion openly" and is not necessarily associated with
violence.
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any concession of oil, which was about to be given in the
M~j~is.

A few patriotic legislators were elected and found

their way into the fifteenth Majlis~

The representatives

',~f the people of Iran were aware that all the misery of'the

people, whether in political or in economical matters" was
because of the ex-British oil company.

Consequently, pub-

lic opinion was strongly provoked against the extortionist
.company.

Furthermore, publ{c opinion was provoked to the

extent that despite all the finagling to ensure the passage
of. the concession, the bill still did not pass in the fif·teenth Majlis.

Also, with all the interest that. the people

'of Tehran showed in the election for the sixteenth Majlis,
they succeeded in sending their own representative to the
sixteenth Majlis, which was clear evidence of their deep
'desire for cancellation of the imposed 1933 oil treaty.
·Certainly. this eagerness existed throughout the country,
. but the result was not as evident as it was in the capital
city of Tehran.

This is not the time, however, to explain

·this.
The people of Tehran elected their own representative,
with the idea that before or after the election for the
sixteenth Majlis, they would be able to voice their opinions
concerning their own destiny.

A few people gathered togeth-

er commenting on the fact that one must not forget the assistance the press and the mass media had given toward
.expressing public opinion.

The strength they provided to

-----.
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this type of activity has continued until today.

The nation-

al plant of the Iranians is almost 'full grown, and I hope to
God that'all the people of Iran will benefit from this as
soon as possible.

Therefore;, anyone who'says that popular

demonstrations were against the interests of the country is
terribly mistaken. B

If the people had not gotten involved

with political and social matters, the law nationalizing oil
would never have passed, and no government would ever have
objected to anything concerning the ex-British oil company.
Whatever the government and the Majlis have done has been
backed by public opinion.

There was no doubt that the

government and both Majlis (the Shorayeh Melli and the'
~enate),

when they are backed by the people, can talk, vote,

and take steps for the interest of the country.
The day after the, oil nationalization law was passed,
I was asked to become the head of the government (Prime
Minister).

I

accepted wholeheartedly, with a deep feeling

of responsibi'lity.

The request had been made previously

when I was a congressman, but I did not accept the position
at that time because I considered myself more usefut in the
'Majlis.

I had come to the conclusion that the national

struggle must start from the 'Majlis, which was my reason
for rejectirig the proposal of my being Prime Minister at

BIID~monstrationU (tazahor) as -used in this context
means a non-violent expression of the people for the betterment of the country.
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that time.

Now the result of that struggle is visible and

is becoming a reality.

Both houses of the Majlis have per-

formed their duty by enforcing the law in the manner pres"cribed "by the law-makers.

I could not keep still with "the

end of "the road in sight and knowing how many had been involved "with almost insurmountable

proble~s.

I was influ-

enced also by the prospect of the enforcement of the law
bE?ing placed in the hands" of the weak, greedy, and sel.fish
government under which the poor people of this country would
not profit from their long struggle.
This wa"s the only reason that I willingly accepted
the difficult position of Prime Minister.

I began to diag-

nose the work as any open-minded, intelligent, non-biased
person would.

I did not want" the government or cabinet to

have anything else in mind except what would be in the best
interest of:the country or the national wish.

At the time,

we needed a single aim uniting the country and providing
internal peace.

The smallest disagreement or episode could

ruin the situation and create chaos.

I chose reputable

people from fine families with records of good health.
These were people I was certain could help me in doing such
an important task.

Other corrections, such as social better-

ment, were certainly needed but could be acquired gradually
in quieter times.
It is no exaggeration for the members of the Majlis to
say that the ex-British oil company is the main reason for all

29
the political, economical, and social problems in this coun,try,.

It is a reality, and it is certain that if we sever

the hands of this ex-British oil company from our country,
no one person or government will be able to maintain the
miserable condition of the past.
Today the people of Iran have awakened.

When the

result of this struggle is evident, I hope to God, with the
"present cooperation and unity, it will bring

~uccess.

Not

only will there be a hundied percent economic gain, but
there will be twice as much non-material gain as well.

It

will bring awareness to the people and also make them take
interest in their own future and destiny.

No one can deny

how important the people's awareness and involvement is for
n.ational government.

When a nation is united and at the

, same time has a government by the people and for ,the people
based on belie~ and'ide6logy rather than fear and force,
,'they will never be under the attack 'and domination of
others.

Today, if we have the ex-British oil company domi-

nating and oppressing in political, economic, and social
affairs of this nation, it is mainly because we. have neglected to 'realize our national power and have surrendered wi th
our hands tied.
In such important moments, God wanted the people to
have the full scope of awareness and start walking in the
path of truth.

The Iranian people are awakened now, and

they know the effect of a strong government backing up its
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oil corporation and threatening this nation with their guns.
The nation of Iran is like a.member of the world's
family and has no other goal except peace.

If a national

uprising started, it would have one aim only--asking for
peace.

But it is impossible to base peace in the Middle

East on the present situation, in which there would be constant danger of losing it.

If the main aim or goal is to

have the oil of Iran, as it was in the. past, for the use of
the free.world, this also is our wish.
toward the same goal.

We will do our best

Iran's government has said many'

times that we are legally responsible to do everything in
our power to prevent any interruption in the sale of oil to
our buyers.
My.government 9

has been willing to cooperate in ensur-

ing proper .oil distribution because we do not want any interruption in its sale.

However, the ex-British oil company

J::las s.tarted many uncooperative activities which interfere
·wi th this goal..

Let the world know that Iran's government

is not responsible for any interruption in the distribution
of oil.

We have done everything within our power to con-

.tinue the work of the ex-British oil company.

We even ac-

cepted their engineers with the same salary and the same
benefits.
. laws.

We have enforced their rulings along with Iranian

We sacrificed as much as we could--we do not have any

9 "My government, dolat Inj'aheb, suggests, when translated into English, an o'vertone of ownership of government.
:However, as before, that is not the case in the original
language.
It
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laws.

We sacrificed as much as we could--we do not have any

more to give.

We feel certain that world public opinion has

discovered this fact.
About the International Court at The Hague, I must
say that Iran's government has always respected and obeyed
the united Nations regulations.

The

gover~ent

of Iran

'has backed this international institution to the fullest
extent~ and in the future, will always do the same.

If

this time the government of Iran did not listen to the
forceful judgment of The Hague Tribunal, it is because we
'have repeatedly announced that the government

of Iran has

'never signed a, treaty or a concession with the .government
of England.

pur opponent in this matter is a business

corporation.
It is very surprising that The Hague Tribunal did not
.pay any attention to Iran's objection, and against the
,basic rules of judgment, did not pass any opinion on our
national government. lO

In this way, they have shaken the

respect of the small nations for the International Court of
Justice.

An international court must look to both strong

and weak nations in the same manner.

Such an international

. court comes into existence for the purpose of maintaining
lOThe British government took the matter to The Hague
Tribunal. The court first passed judgment in England's
favor, and only after Mossedeq's persistence did it retract
its former decision, deciding "that it had no legal jurisdiction over the case" (John Marlowe, I"ran [New Yo~k:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963], p. 96).
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peace in the world and to
the,weaker countries.

maint~in

T~is

justice, especially for

kind of international justice

court must follow a policy of equality for all nations,
'large and small.

If the small nations do not believe in

the fundamental justice of such an institution, only God
'k.'n,ows what disastrous results may occur.
t~e

According to

basic laws of national government in our country, we

have the right to ask that certain merchants leave our
country because they prevent political and economic independence.

We will reimburse them fairly for any loss.

This,

being the basic right of any nation, has been written in
t

I

the principles of the United Nations.

Therefore, if we

l.ook at it on a realistic level, the denial of the judgment
of the International Court of Justice shows our interest in
these international institutions.

Some of the nations of

th,e world are doing- their best to make the International
Court of Justice look worthless and represent i t as an instrument of evil to the people of the world, when the evil
is really of their own doing.
I have definitely decided that with the backing of
the people of Iran and of his Majesty the Shah, and with
the support of both houses of the Majlis, according to the
law, we cannot make the slightest move in the wrong direction.

I will, do my duty with all my strength and persist-

ence.

As long as I am traveling the difficult road that we

have chosen and am encouraged and supported by public

-.--~.---
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opinion, I am not afraid of any difficulty.

I have no feqr

at all, even if the British government and the ex-British
oil company, by using various'means both within and outside of our country, are doing everything they can to
overthrow my government.
'gle.

I will not weaken in this strug-

I am certain that it has arrived at a point where it

must continue in the natural way until it reaches its goal.
~ow I am very old-~the sun of my life has reached the edge

"of the roof.

Sooner or later I must go the way that every-

one has to go--die.
However, whether I am dead or alive, I hope, in fact
I am certain, that the fire that has start'ed will not die
and will kindle a spark in' the men of this country to pursue the national struggle until they acquire the de.sired
'result.

If we don't have freedom of action in our horne

and foreigners dominate us with a rope around our neck
pulling us to whichever side they wish, death is preferable
'to such a life.

The people of Iran, with such a brilliant

historical past, and all they have done for the culture and
civil,ization of the world, will never tolerate such a situation.

Today our people have started a vast struggle, and

no one is unaware of its importance.

In this type of so-

cial movement, of course, one must be strong and
'suffer many deprivations.

.._--------
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small, will be successful unless we work hard.
do our best, we will accomplish nothing.
Fo~

Unless we

ll

many years I have suffered from poor health and

have learned that there are' two kinds of cures.

There are

cures that deal with, the origin of the sickness and also
,cures for the result.

'Applying this theory to the problems

of our country, I have proposed two categories which should
ma,nifest a cure for the

II

sickness" of our country.

One of

, them is enforcement of the oil nationalization law and banishment of the ex-British oil company, because it is a
'form of corruption against everyone.
we havecdone
ment

age~ts

~verything

possible.

To achieve this goal we ,h

There have been govern-

and members of special commissions appointed.

I

So far tliere have been no mistakes, and we are very hopeful
this will continue until we achieve the.greatest possible
success.
The second basic cure, in my opinion, is to correct
our election ,laws.

A bill has

bee~

prepared and proposed to

the Majlis, and passing that bill is what the people expect.
Of course, experienced representatives will participate in
discussions regarding this bill.
tect the rights of the people.

Their function is to proFuture governments must

conform to the new election laws, and the representatives
'1lThis paragraph was underscored by the translator.
It is frequently used by Mossedeq's followers as a slogan.
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of the people have the responsibility of enforcing the constitution, thus assuring Iran of a democratic form of government.
This government under no circumstances is willing to
intervene in future elections; and as long as the oil situation is not settled this government will remain in power.
Even, though I am weak, I will not step aside [the representatives shouted, "Well done!"] unless both M.ajlis should
'request that I do so.

As long as

th~s

hasn't occurred, I

will remain until the conclusion of the oil business.

If

(God forbid) the oil business has not been settled by the
date set, for the next election, the government will bring a
bill to the Majlis to delay the elections.

In this way, we

ensure no interruption in the oil proceedings.

Dear sirs,

'if (God forbid) the situation regarding oil is prolonged to
that point, there must be a delay in the election.
sured, however, that this government will bring

a

Be asbill to

the Majlis~ and if you gentlemen vote on it, of course the
eiection will be delayed.

[At this point Shoushtary com-

mented, "Why do you bring lifl into the situation?U]

Be-

cause anyone can only be certain at the utmost of what he
is doing, and I cannot trust the international situation.
[Deputies:

"You I re right! "]

Although it is essential to deal with the cause of an
illness, it is sometimes imperative to do whatever is
necessary at the present moment for the general well-being

--_._---
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of the sick person.

One of the ways that our opponent has

chosen to bring us to our knees and stop us from destroying
the cause of the sickness of our country is to create prob. lems for our national budget and our country's economy.
One problem regarding economy is the money exchange.
This is

d~e

to the fact that we have not received any money

from the ex-British oil company.

The Iranian National Bank

has reminded me of the situation by letter, and they have
done a few things to eliminate the money exchange problem.
The bank has directed the government's attention to
this depression of foreign exchange and especially to "imports •. After discussing the matter with the experts, a
bill has been prepared which will provide a large part of
the necessary imports for the country.

The transfer of

. guaranteed funds outside the country is a most appropriate
thing to do, all things considered.
Another problem concerns the nationalization of oil,
the enforcement of

~he

law regarding this and maintaining

the vast refinery until normal business is resumed with our
previous customers.

This is essential in order to reach

our ultimate national desire.
rifice.

We must be prepared to sac-

One of the important duties of every member of

this nation is to help the national budget of the government as much as they can.
Fortunately, the peopl~ of Iran, with all the patriotic emotion they have displayed in recent times, have proven

_ _ _ _ •
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their loyalty to the government in time of disaster.

In

turp, the government has been worthy of their trust.

As we

have seen ' from the beginning of the deportation of foreigners, unde,r the "hands off" policy, many ambitious people
have willingly given all they had ,to the government.,

They

, have offered everything, and this government with gratitude
,has said, "Not yet, wait until we really need your help and
We will utilize these individuals and groups."
start of the oil sale to our foreign
, vide budgets for all expenses.

c~stomers,

Until.the
we must pro-

Right now our government

income is not enough •. With the trus~ that we have in the
faithfulness of the public, there is a bill written enabling
us to borrow the amount of two billion rials.

12

To overcome the problem resulting from lack of em~loyment

we must do something immediately.

Therefore, after

long discussions with the Import-Export Bank of the United
States, we have again discussed a credit in the amount of
25 million for 15 years.

This money would be used for

agricultural machinery and road building.
this matter as soon as possible.

We must act upon

By selling and distribut-

ing the agricultural machinery among our farmers, different
types of crops can be harvested.

It should reduce the

volume of imported sugar and add to the level of our cotton
l2 The equivalent of approximately 2-1/2 million dollars.

--- - -- -- ----
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exports as well as other agricultural products.

It should

make us very happy that this credit from the U.

S. Import-

Export Bank is

no~

going to be spent for nonproductive ma-

terials, such as armaments.

It will be spent for things,

, that benefit the people, and as a result will considerably
expand our total product10n level.
Even though it seemed essential to rush these bills
,through"

you representatives should have enough time to

study these subjects.

Therefore, no pressure had been ex-

", ercised to pass these bills.
~ajlis

in the regular way.

They have been offered to the
Of course, the government ex-

pects a decision as soon as possible in order to achieve
our goal.

However, it depends upon factors such as the

people's', will and also that they do their best to carry it
out. ,Another important element is that foreigners will be
unable-to do anything to ruin our work or destroy our unity.
We must unite and not allow our deceitful opponent to get
what he wants.
i~g
'th~

You may be sure that the free world is back-

us all the way, and that the name of Iran is held in
highest esteem.
In conclusion, I wish to relate a personal experience

of some 50 years ago with men who had no conception of politics.

Near the town of Qualeh Morqui was some land I had

inherited; the' land next to it was called Gi.
perienced some land disagreements.

We had ex-

In my state then were

two groups of peasants or farmers who were antagonistic

-
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toward each other.

If one day I assigned one group to do

certain work, the other group would not go to work--until
the time we had some disagreements with our neighbor.

We

had a discussion and the farmers from both groups said,
'" n

Previous ly when the landlord told us to do some work in

our village, because of our antagonism, one group would go
.tq work and the other would not.
village.

But that was in our own

Now this disagreement is outside of our village,

and the v,illage is the base of our life.

So we must unite,

: and following the order of the landlord, go and fight."
Whep peasants who know nothing about politics and who
are disagreeing among themselves can have such a sincere
feeling of unity and togetherness, the same things can be
experienced by other groups.

We must not expect the two

houses of the Majlis, the Shorayeh Melli and the Senate, and
,.also the press in this country, not to verbalize their in'ternal problems.

However, when the government has a dis-

agreement with some foreign power, it should be the right
and privilege of everyone to unite with his government.
I do not say that in this government there are no mistakes, but it is our task to correct those errors.

If we

succeed in this task, the people of Iran will be able to
accomplish anything.
Improvements require money.

Much of the time of this

government is spent on things resulting from unemployment.
,

,

For ,exampl'e, a great deal of time was spent on the factories
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of Isfahan and Azarbaijan because they were closed down.
,Any improvement requires money, and this problem is
,not solved by'eliminating a few employees or transferring'
them from one place to another.

If you have credit and

capital, plan the production expenses within the countryF s
',budget and put the people to work.

As soon as possible,

the people will leave government work and start other enterprises.

People today want to get a job with the govern-

ment because of poverty.
We have collected many documents

cO~gerning

ference of the ex-British oil company.

the inter-

It has dominated our

political and social life and committed many other wrongs.
If one day the

governme~t

of England takes Iran to the

United Nations and registers a complaint, that day these
documents will prove how much the ex-corporation has done
" ,against this country's internal affairs and how it has
'ruined our lives. ,At such a time, the free nations of the
world will know the truth, and they can better judge the
situation.
countrymen.

Those documents are not provided to our fellow
If England should take us before the United

Nations, then we can submit them to let all the world know
the position of this poor nation (Iran).
has lost everything to thi's ex-company.

In 50 years Iran
Anyway, dear sirs,

these documents are not collected for the people of this
country •

._---
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I say it's good if you gentlemen do not mention the
matters which bring disagreement among us in the Majlis.
Of course I do not want to say that because the oil situation is in process we must do wrong things.

We must do the

right thing as well as doing all we can for the oil situa:t:;ion--go forward.

[Shoushtary interjected a comment, nDear

Doctor, disagreement is bad.
No

m~~ter

Stop the reason for it."]

how much happens in this Majlis, all of ,the

disagreement within the Majlis will serve the ex-British oil
company.

If you gentlemen agree, once or twice a week'we

can have the vice-secretaries of the different ministries
gather in the Majlis to discuss their ideas with one another.
If you gentlemen have any opinions concerning improvements in your own locality, I have no objection whatsoever.
'I want to see these things done, but gentlemen, please do
not disturb the Majlis.

In the Majlis everyone should

totally support the government.

If at any time you should

decide that this government should not remain, first discuss
it and then with one vote you can get rid of the government.
Personally, God knows, I would be very grateful to you 'because, with my illness, work is difficult.

However" this

is my national duty and inspires me to continue.
I am asking all the vice-ministers ,to gather any time
they want in the Majlis and answer any questions you may
have.

If they do not convince you with their answers, you

--_.-_...-
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gentlemen can come directly to me.

If I personally do not

do anything about it, then go to the Shoraye Melli and discuss those matters.

If we do it in this way, first of all

it will not take the Majlis' time needlessly.

Secondly,

you will not become famous among the people for objecting
to this government which is struggling with the ex-British
oil company or perhaps for doing something against the
national government.
God knows whatever I have said, I said it for you,
and not for myself.

------_ .. -

CHAPTER V
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
To analyze Mohammed Mossedeq's rhetoric properly, one
must understand the background and the environment thoroughly.

For example, the translated speech was inspired

in large part by the conflict between Iran and the oil
interests of the British government.

In addition, one

must understand that there are several possible ways of
',performing a rhetorical analysis, all within the meaning of
the word rhetoric.

However, in a study with a limited

scope such as this one, the rhetorical analysis, though of
vital importance, has to be limited to a discussion of the
-major aspects of the speech under consideration.
There are very few English language sources on
Mohammed Mossedeq which are not written by historians or
political scientists.

Unfortunately, in the available lit-

erature, the most important characteristics of the man have
been ignored.

In order to understand another culture, one

must overcome one's own cultural boundaries.

And this is

rarely achieved, since language and culture are inseparable.
Therefore, for the purpose of this study my research was
done mainly from the original literature.

-----~.
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The

~riginal

types (since 1953).

Farsi materials by and large are of two
There is the collection of several

volumes of the actual speeches taken from the press and
the Majlis records, and there is the rhetoric of Mossedeq's
devoted followers ,. which obviously is biased in his favor.
However, in recent years Mossedeq's student followers have
. developed an intellectual

~pproach

to their own biases.

That is, they have found a rationale for the movement
Mohammed Mossedeq initiated.
One of the latest accomplishments of these students
is their 'international model based on Mossedeq's philosophy.
This model forms the basis for current discussion with1~ the
framework of nationalistic movements, which is most helpful
for the present type of study, and, more important, for the
awareness of the world.
Because Mossedeq's speeches involve many years, many
different occasions, and many different subjects, it is impossible to choose one or several speeches to translate
and come up with a just example of Mossedeq's rhetoric.
-However, the speech chosen for translation, taken trom the
period in which Mossedeq actually achieved some of his objectives,

~as

selected for its concluding and summarizing

merit as far as Mossedeq himself was concerned.

There is a

verified text of the speech, as well as recordings of it.
This speech was delivered as most of Mossedeq's speeches
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were--partially prepared and partially extemporaneous.
All Mossedeq's speeches were delivered around the same
philosophy and toward the same goal as this particular
speech.

Its purpose, both generally and specifically, was

to bring political awareness to the people's representa'tives
i~

the Majlis as well as to the public, by means of the

mass media press and the'national radio stations.

Because

,'there was no television at that time, the radio played a
great role in getting his message to the public. l
The speech also seems intended to convince and persuade the people and the nation as a whole, as well as the
Third World nations, to be involved in, choosing their own '
destiny.

His purpose was, therefore, to inform people, to

make them aware, then to persuade and convince them to act
upon their principles.

Unlike what we find in the views of

some historians and political scientists, such as that
Mossedeq did everything to keep himself in power, this
speech shows that his purpose, in reality, was just the opposite.

He portrays a humble, selfless type of'person in

'this speech when he says,

II

. if you donrt want to do

this which seems right to me, you, the representatives of
the people ,. can impeach my government and someone else can
come and do the job. n2
lIn Iran, the national radio stations have been very
popular as a media tool.
2 Makan, p. 47.
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46
In classifying the speech, one should categorize it
as policy forming and professional, rather than ceremonial.
or social.

The speech begins by conveying the horrors of

foreign domination with its lack of freedom, the most important ingredient of the people's life.

Then the speaker

deals with the mistakes of statesmen and governments which
had yielded such terrible results.
mediate

He explains to the im-

audien~e3 just how much responsibility 1ay with the

Majlis and how they, the audience, could have prevented all
those mistakes by acting under Iran's policy regarding foreign' powers within the country.
f~es

The speech strongly speci-

the losses that the people had to suffer because of

their own lack.of political awareness and, even more so,
because of that of the dishonest representatives within the
government.

Not so much in this speech but in other

speeches, 4 Mossedeq very openly admits the corruption of
the government officials, or the so-called people's representatives, and its terrible consequences.
The chosen speech shows that the speaker has a deep
political awareness and illustrates how clearly he could
see the situation--specifically, how the Tudeh
Communist

~arty),

(Iran's

the only well-organized political party

that Iran has ever had, had obstructed the nationalistic
3Although this speech'was formally addressed to the
members of the Majlis, it was also directed to the populace,
who formed an audience outside the building and listened
to the speech over loudspeakers.
4Speeches of Dr. Mossedeq in the' Sixteenth Majlis, p. 9.
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goals by opposing both Mossedeq's nationalistic government
and ,the minority in the Majlis.

The speech exp1ains that

no matter how litt1e was the awareness of a few people in
,the past, it had been extremely helpful to a nationalistic
gqvernment.

Consequently, how much better it would be for

the people, the press, and the mass media to pursue those
-activities which help the nationalistic government.
early par,t of the speech establishes the
a~~reness

tho~ght

An

that an'

of political reality can only be advantageous for

the people and the country.
One must note that Mossedeq, throughout his long
life and political career, always was a law-abiding man who
wanted to see that everything went according to the regulations.

This was true until the very last moments of his

life, when he began' to support the ideology that people
should get what is theirs by any'means necessary.
speech in question

~omes

The

when Mossedeq was younger, however,

and therefore its constant theme is to act according 'to the
constitution and other laws of the land for which so many
good men were sacrificed.
The central theme of this speech deals with an historical analysis of what has happened, what is happening, and
what will happen by

p~rsuing

certain policies.

After estab-

lishing the historical facts and explaining what has happened politically, economically, and socially under a nonnationalistic policy that did not have the peop1e's interest

------------~~-----
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at heart, the speech relates the issue of the rights of the
people to the present situation.
'ea~lier

Mossedeq explains that

his government had even been willing to go along

with certain demands of foreign powers to show that he was
only interested in getting the people their rights, not in
imposing anything on otner nations or their corporations.
The speaker, throughout his speech brings about an
awareness that international courts of law are not neces~arily

always just institutions.

It could very well be

that The 'Hague Tribunal was not just in taking England's
side and ignoring Iran's government, simply because England
was a world power.

And the government of England had no

right backing a corporation that, as.a private company,
legally had nothing tq do with them.
To explain how the government of Iran was justified
~n

not recognizing The Hague decision as either just or

unjust is simple.

The matter should never even have been

.submitted to the International Court of Justice, since it
was not within its legal jurisdiction.

It would have been

within the International Court's purview had it been a case
of two sovereign nations having problems with one another;
but it was instead the sovereign nation of Iran opposing
a private oil company.

Mossedeq's speech reached its

climactic point and greatly excited his audience when he
declared, first of all, that the British government had no
right,to take such a matter to the International Court,
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second, that it was not within the Court's jurisdiction, and
finally, that it was the

r~ght

of the government of Iran to

refuse to accept the decision.
The speech had succeeded by this point at logically
relating the seemingly isolated conflict between the private
'oil'company, England, and the sovereign government of Iran
to,' the international situation.

Then the speech ,expresses

. how surprising it is to find such a mockery of justice within the International Court of Justice.

It goes on to sug-

gest that if these are the kinds of decisions made, then the
peoples ,of the world, mainly th~ Third World, should not
'and will not trust such institutions in the future.
!

Once

I

these small nations recognize

t~at

the International Court

only takes the side of the world imperialists, then they
will not believe in it any longer, which will be disastrous
for the world peace.

(In the end, however, Mossedeq, through

his persistence, logic, and knowledge of international law,
won. )
The speech concludes that it is unjust for people to
be underdogs; when the people decide they can achieve their
goals and assume their rights, then it is time for them to
act accordingly and avoid the mistakes of others in the past.
In other words, "where there is a means, there is a way"
could very well express the level of political awareness
that Mossedeq was trying to convey in his speech.

---_ ..
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The language of the speech creates a mood of sincerity,
a tone of determination and belief in just principles.

It

moves the audience to the point that it doesn't really mat'ter if the speaker is alive or dead, for it is the task
which remains always important, it is the task which must be
pursued.

The speech stresses the importance of being aware

.of just principles and tries to persuade the audience to
take action.
Persuasion, by means of force or threat, is not typical of Mossedeq.

However, he used concrete objects, especi-

'ally his cane,S to stir the people and their represenfatives
to feel the absolute necessity of the struggle againE!t imperi.alism and how worthless life becomes without dignity
and freedom, the most sacred parts of a man's life.
The main effect of the logic of this speech lies in
the changing of a theoretical reality into a practical
reality that is far more meaningful to the masses.
Mossedeq's speeches cannot be ignored as far as technical
and psycholqgical appeals are concerned.

The speech con-

stantly reminds the audience of the speaker's as well as
the people's interests, beliefs, motives, and desires.
SThis writer observed on several occasions Mossedeq
as he delivered a speech, at the highlight of which he would
oft·en point the cane at the audience or the sky. Many times
to emphasize his illness and frailty, he would lean on it.

- - - - - - -----
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More important, though, is that the speaker is highly aware
of his audience as a Middle Eastern people who are constant·ly relating on a highly emotional level with most matters
of life.

It is a well-known characteristic of the speaker

that if it became necessary he would cry, faint, or actually
become

p~ysically

inoperative.

Because Mossedeq was so

deeply committed to whatever he said, emotional appeals
·played a very important part of his delivery.
Mossedeq's personal credentials at the time of the
speech were a matter of divided opinion.
~nd

His integrity

loyalty were not denied, and perhaps were even sup-

ported, by his opposition.

His experience was also known

and accepted in all camps.

It was his judgment that was

questioned by his opponents.

But through his speech one

comes to the conclusion that the speaker's judgment could
not have been so far off if for half a century of experience
he had proved his loyalty, honesty and integrity.
The language used in this speech is highly communicative for the speaker used a very simple, down-to-earth
language.

Only seldom would Mossedeq quote from the Koran

-or other highly accepted sources.

However, he does make

frequent reference to God, whicp has cultural and psychological significance for an Iranian.

It-reinforces the

speaker's ethics and religious beliefs, as well as his good
standing with God, which is mutually accepted by the speaker

--~-
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and his audience.

The language of Mossedeq is very direct

and forceful; yet his choice of words and his sentence
- structure are very simple and easily understood.

Although

the nature of Farsi is to be very redundant, Mossedeq's
speeches, even when he was dealing with highly technical
material, were, for the most part, not at all boring.

They

'" we:r;e al so well unders tood by his audiences, who were large,ly illiterate.
Due to the characteristics of his delivery, such as
the way he communicated with his audience, his poise and
gestures, as well as the simplicity of his articulation and
his calm voice,6 Mossedeq would draw a vast number of people
outside the Majlis. ' They would listen to his words through
tbe

loudsp~akers,

applauding frequently, and it seemed that

-the crowd did not need to listen to every word, since everyone listening seemed to know exactly what he would say next.
The immediate effect of the speech was often that the crowd
would bodily carry him quite a distance after he appeared at
the entrance to the Majlis.

One must appreciate that the

public support Mossedeq received had not been experienced
by any Iranian statesman before this time.
Perhaps the most important part of rhetorical

~nalysis

6Mossedeq was well-known for his steady, calm voice
(except when he became highly emotional). This writer has
,three recorded speeches.
It is interesting to note that it
was the content of the speeches more than his vocal theatrics, which triggered reactions from the crowds.
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is

~he

s-tudy of effect:

whether there are ultimate or im-

mediate effects of the speech.
speeches was quite unusual.
man, statesman,

polit~cian,

The effect of Mossedeq's

For over a century no

spokes~

or ordinary man from the .

Middle East had been so effective in bringing an awareness
and understanding of the international situation to the
people, of whom the majority were very politically unaware,
as well as to their representatives who were so corrupted.
The effectiveness of Mossedeq's speeches was of such a
high degree that by rhetoric alone was he able to gain the
. public support of Iran.

Moreover, he was one of the

father-initiators of the movement of the oppressed peoples
of the world against imperialistic powers.

Due in part

-to Mossedeq's long-range influence, more than fifty dominated
nations, who were nothing more than colonies, in essence,
have achieved their sovereignty.
This writer finds it difficult to form a 'value judgment of this speech or other speeches made over half a
century by Mossedeq.

However, it is evident that through

his philosophy, speeches, and writings, Mossedeq was able
to inspre the people to realize that before all else they
must "become themselves" to succeed.

It is not only in

this one speech but in all of Mossedeq's speeches that
such a deep theme comes clearly across:

If the people do

not have freedom on all levels, then death is preferable.
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Mossedeq convinced the people he wanted to convince; thus
his.torically, he becomes very significant.
With his most basic human tool, his language, Mossedeq
was highly successful.

But his success in persuasion re-

flects not only rhetorical merit but also a high level of
literary merit.

After twenty years, history shows that

what this man started in his speeches has not died or faded
away with the speaker's death.

He says in the very high-

.

light of his speech, "whether I am dead or alive I hope, in
fact I am certain, that this fire will never die away and
that the awakened men of this country will pursue the national struggle until they achieve their goal.,,7

As

'one young Iranian put it, "The life of thoughts does not end
w'ith the death of the thinker; thoughts make history and
endure for cent'uries.

Mossedeq through the school of

Mossedeq and the school of Mossedeq through the followers
of that school are alive forever."
7

8

Makan, p. 46.

,
. 8Mossedeq and Negative Equilibrium, p. 39 (my translatl.on).

----- -----------

CHAETER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In presenting 'the translation and analysis of a
speecp by Mo?ammed Mossedeq, we first introduced the subject· and basic characteristics of the spee9h and then justified a. study of this type by virtue of the misconceptions
,about Mossedeq held in Western societies.

A short biography

then aealt with Mossedeq's place in history and with the
biographical significance of matters concerning him.
next chapter discussed how

c~ltural

The

and philosophical dif-

ferences affect translation and how this translator had to
, face certain practical problems.

The main body of this

study, the translation, was then offered.

It was, as

previously mentioned, difficult to select a speech 'that
would provide a

~rue

example of Mossedeq, who created and

pursued the same philosophy with the same rhetoric for over
half ·a century.

In the "Rhetorical Analysis" chapter we

attempted to systematically analyze Mossedeq's speech.
In this conclusion, we intend to discuss Mossedeq's discourse, values, and uniqueness, which have affected not
onl'y Iranians but the whole Third World as wel1.
It is important to note that

~-1ossedeq,

from his

early years, 'recognized the basic problems of his poor and

-
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deprived country.

These problems were, as he mentipned many

times throughout his career, first, the

.
fore~gn

~bi;!'.

,I'~~\\

~~~

~

pO'wer,S.

(wo:r;-ld imperia,lists, dominated by England), with their
ruthlessness and their dishonest economic pOlicies.
Se'cond was the, total corruption wi thin the Iranian goverriment--bribery, dishonesty, and imperialistic
p~.rsonal

dea~ings

for

gain of the ruling· cla'ss against their own people.

·Thiro. was the lack of awareness and education of his people,
which made Mossedeq's task in combating the problem
difficult.

v~ry

As a solution for the first problem--impe·ri-

alistic domination and interference with the internal af-,
fair,s of a small nation--Mossedeq pursued the philosophy
of negative equilibrium, in line with his feeling that po, litical equilibrium is a necessity.
, The first step Mossedeq took was the nationalization
of all natural

resource~,

mainly oil, throughout Iran, and

'the dismissing of all agents of foreign governments, mainly
England's.

As for the second problem--the corruption within

his small country's ruling class--he, in contrast to the'
tratlition of the ruling class of Iran, lived a very simple
and absolutely honest life.

He pursued a constant course

of action, of which the highlight was the correction of the
election laws on all levels. ' In doing so, he set an
example himself.

-_ _
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The third problem--the lack of political awareness and
eduq~tion of his people--is a very significant and compli-

,

cate4 problem for any educator.

Because of this lack,

Mossedeq actually did many things he did not ta1k about,
such as allowing the people more freedom of action, speech,
. 'and press than what might have seemed necessary at the
'time.

He also allowed the mass media, .particularly the

pr~~s,

a,nd political groups of different camps to go to

extremes and even criticize him' personally.

A11. of this

h¢lp'ed improve the people's understanding and awareness

qy

exposing many hidden problems.
Mossedeq's goal, specifically as well as generally,

was the helping of non-privileged people, not only in Iran
but in the entire Third World.

Mossedeq was perhaps the

best thing that has happened in contemporary history to
the Iranian nation.

Like many great men of the world, his

,'unselfish, down-to-earth attitude is certainly worthy of
rec~gnition,

especially since he was from the highest level

of his society.

In one of his speeches he said, " • • • may

God damn those who in these desperate days of our nation
make a statue of me."l
It is clear that not only did Mossedeq have a strong
nationalistic attitude, having organized the philosophy of
negative, equilibrium based on

redi~covering

one's self

through political and economical independence, he also had
IMoSsedeq and Negative Equilibrium, p. 39 (my translation).
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a.universal outlook on the world situation.
v~r¥

Mossedeq knew

well that socio-economic change, the struggle for free-

dom,,. dignity, and independence, is not only an Iranian
problem but also that of the Third World.

Thus, when he

became Prime Minister of Iran, he sent a telegram to I.:r:an' s
chief delegate to the Seventh Assembly of the United Nations,
saying,
~ecause

one of my government's basic foreign policies
is to help nations who are struggling for their
.right of independence, when Morocco and Tunisia's
groblems are discussed in the united Nations, you
are di.rectly ordered to give any possible help to
the deprived ~frican nations who are asking for
their sovereignty. Furthermore, since the mentioned countries 'do not have representatives in the
United Nations, announce officially that Iran's
government is wholeheartedly willing to have their
innocent voice reach the ears of the world's people
from the Uni.ted' Nations podium.
(Signed)
The ~rime
Minister, Mohammed Mossedeq. October 14, 1952.
Because of the misconceptions about Mossedeq in the
West, many scholars look at the man from ,a different point
of view.

Most available English language sources are pro-

imperialism and anti-Mossedeq.

This makes a study of the

present kind (which is biased toward Mossedeq) justified.
For the most part, the final chapter of Mossedeq's political
career is either not mentioned or misconstrued.

The fact

remains that after the oil nationalization, Mossedeq
trust.ed the United States to assist his nationalistic gov'ernment at least economically and to stop England, which at
2 Ibid., p. '47 (my translation).
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that- time had her gunboats pointed at Iran's shore on the
Perpian Gulf.
sup~rficial

The United states, instead, while giving

hopes to Mossedeq, in reality cut off all of

lran's foreign aid and gave an enormous amount of credit
to England to buy all of the oil products she needed from
'the western hemisphere.
,Uni't;~d

And if that wasn't enough, the

States, through the C.I.A., then planned an illegal

coup~d'etat
C.I~A.,

to overthrow Mossedeq.

With the he1p

o~

the

Iran's ruling class captured Mossedeq and placed

him in prison.
In the final analysis, as biased as it seems, what
\

I

condemns Mossedeq is what he

fough~

for all his life.

The

,mistakes Mossedeq is charged with are the trust he put in
his friendly appearing enemies, in the corrupt ruling class
of Iran, and in the United states government, which spoiled
Mossedeq's dreams and, through the C.I.A. scandal, cost
him his government.

As far as the American government is

concerned, my point is best made by Richard W. Cottam:
" . • • the paradox is that in the interest of combating com,munism, the United States has been pursuing a policy of
economic determinism that might well produce not a Nasser
but a Castro-type leadership.,,3
In spite of all of these setbacks and problems,
3

Cottam, p. 319.
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Mo·ss·~d..eq,

str~;Igle

in half a century, motivated millions to begin the
for their freedom by non-violent means within the

law., . He a'cted upon whatever he said, and through his ac~ions,

he achieved the highest goal that he had wanted.

He

then said, nWha:t else can I ask for, when in my own lifetime
I

~ee

the struggle that we have started is now in progress,

and people are pursuing what is their 'right, and the fire
which has started will neyer die. n4
In Iran, a nation of 30 million people, more than 60
per~~nt

of. the populat.ion live in rural areas, and more than

80. percent are illiterate.
figures.

These, however, are fairly recent

Twenty years ago they were much higher and, in

fact, the illiteracy and rural living patterns enabled the
Wesbern imperialists to dominate the country, thereby forcing their separatism policy successfully among the people.
l

It was at this time and under these conditions that Mohammed
Mossedeq managed to bring awareness and unity to his people
i~

order that they would defeat the foreign powers within

and without their country.

Although these foreign powers

'gained back their role, by legal or illegal means,
Mossedeq's ideology remains popular today not only among
his people but a good portion of the Third World as well.
4MOssedeq and Negative Equilibrium, p. 14 (my translation) •
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Richard

w.

Cottam has probably done one of the most

ob'j~'ctive studies concerning Iranian nationalism.

0
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